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Book Review
Nicholas A. Jones, The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of
Law in Rwanda and Arusha. New York: Routledge, 2010. Pp. 229,
cloth. $130.00 US.
Reviewed by Gerald Caplan, Independent Scholar, Toronto, ON

Countries emerging from the dark night of conflict and oppression into the light of a
new dawn face an almost limitless number of seemingly intractable problems. Think
of Cambodia after the Khmer, South Africa after apartheid, Rwanda after the genocide. The economy, unemployment, infrastructure, governance, public service, schooling, health care, reconciliation, justice, trauma—all need to be dealt with, and all
simultaneously. Yet over the last two decades, of all these daunting challenges it
has been issues related to post-conflict justice and reconciliation that have received
most public attention. An entire industry of professionals and institutions who claim
to be expert in guiding such societies in transition to new levels of justice and harmonious living has grown up in response to this. In tandem, a related academic discipline of scholars studying these experiments and evaluating them has sprung up.
We need to hope these specialists can deliver on their promises, for issues
related to justice are extraordinarily complex, far more than is often assumed. The
subject includes its own multitude of sub-concepts, many of them entirely contradictory of and conflicting with others. For some time after South Africa escaped from
apartheid, its Truth and Reconciliation Commission was the best-known example of
a dramatic attempt to deal with the issue. The very title implied that the truth
about apartheid would lead to reconciliation between white and black South Africans. This reflected the idealistic notion of restorative as opposed to retributive
justice, a concept embraced by Bishop Tutu but not the mothers of Africans who discovered how the apartheid intelligence services had tortured and murdered their
children. The truth can make you bitter.
In recent years, among those who pursue the elusive goal of transitional justice,
South Africa has been replaced as the center of attention by Rwanda. This has
reflected both the number of Rwandan institutions involved in the apparent search
for post-genocide justice and their inherent fascination—the regular Rwandan justice
system, which had been almost entirely destroyed during the genocide; the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) set up in Arusha, Tanzania, by a
guilt-ridden Security Council; and the gacaca courts, a unique institution developed
in Rwanda by Rwandans to deal with the vast number of accused who could not be
accommodated at either of the other two judicial levels.
Naturally, scholars have been racing to observe and study this remarkable phenomenon for several years already, and now that gacaca is over and the ICTR is
winding down, we can expect the number of books and articles to explode as a result.
Some of these contributions have been welcome and enlightening; for example, Timothy
Longman’s essay in the latest Peace Review and Clark and Kaufman’s recent collection of edited essays, After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond. (See my review in Pambazuka
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News.) That Longman, Clark, and Kaufman reach substantially different conclusions
about the gacaca process merely underlines the complexity of the issues involved and
the need for rigorous scholarship at all times.
Nicholas Jones’s book, which is the subject of this review, has a daunting title,
The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda and Arusha, and is
yet another contribution to the subject. But it is not, I fear, up to the standards the
subject demands.
There are several problems. First, Jones is a very awkward writer, apparently
unaware at times of common syntax, grammar, and word meaning. For example, he
writes of ‘‘a part of Rwanda history that people do not contend,’’ by which he means
that experts don’t dispute this aspect of Rwandan history. He states that the ‘‘racist
underpinnings of the Hutu social revolution became the moniker for the future
ethnic divide,’’ although ‘moniker’ is simply an informal word for ‘name’. He quotes
another author, making the statement ‘‘justice becomes the causality of a political
calculation,’’ when it is clear that the original author had written ‘‘casualty.’’ Plus
we are told, ‘‘The capacity for achieving reconciliation will be argued to be associated
with the type of justice . . .’’ There’s really no excuse for such clumsiness and so many
errors of literacy.
There are also too many errors of fact, some of them perhaps of only minor
consequence. Even so, can we not expect that the names of his sources be spelled
correctly? I was not thrilled to find my own name misspelled as ‘‘Kaplan’’ in several
places, even though it was spelled correctly elsewhere. Scott Straus’ name is also frequently misspelled. It suggests a certain sloppiness about the work in general, and
calls the author’s credibility into question.
More consequential errors include the following examples. The RPF did not
‘‘force the Hutu army and militias west, past the French lines of Operation Turquoise and into the DRC.’’ The French army, on its own initiative, allowed the génocidaires to escape into Congo, setting the stage for the appalling tragedy that has
befallen the eastern part of that country in the last fifteen years. The French establishment must not be let off the hook by the assertion that the RPF was responsible
for France’s brazen negligence and their complicity with genocidal killers.
Jones seems confused, and certainly confuses us about the number of Hutu who
participated in the genocide. On page 28 he says ‘‘recent estimates . . . suggest that
projections place the number between 760,000 and one million,’’ and cites his interview with J.B. Mutangana. But he fails to explain who J.B. Mutangana is. (In fact,
there is no appendix listing his interviewees and giving their backgrounds, a serious
omission in this kind of study.) Then in footnote 22 on page 103, he introduces
the ‘‘Scott Strauss’’ (sic) estimate of 200,000 perpetrators. But he never reconciles
these impossibly different estimates, even though the number of alleged perpetrators
directly affected the functioning of the justice system.
On page 39 he refers to a person with the last name of ‘‘Morgenthau,’’ who is
never identified and is not named in the index. A paragraph later he refers to
another individual called ‘‘Stimson’’ who is in the index but about whom not a word
of description is offered. Who are these people, and what is their expertise with relation to Rwandan history?
On page 67 he refers to the massacres of the 1960s as ‘‘early trial runs of genocide.’’ This is a very problematic assertion and can’t be stated in such an absolute
way. But it’s possible he is simply reporting what a source said; this is a problem
we run into on several important occasions in the book, where it’s not clear whether
Jones is agreeing with a source or merely reporting an individual’s statement. He
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Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:1 April 2010

does this again on the same page, where he cites Kigabo as saying that ‘‘the Catholic
Church was not strong enough to prevent these people [Hutu] from going to kill
those people [Tutsi] because basically they [Church and state] had become one
body.’’ Does Jones agree with this statement? And who is Kigabo? This is yet another
interviewee about whom we know absolutely nothing. As to the statement, it lets the
Catholic Church off far too easily. The church had whatever agency it chose to exercise, even if it was the virtually official state church of Rwanda, and those within the
hierarchy might even have been able to stop the genocide in its tracks. Not only did
the Church never come close to trying, it at least implicitly condoned the killings,
along with offering critical legitimacy to the government.
Some of these errors are related to the central issues of the Rwandan genocide,
which means they undermine the reader’s confidence in Jones’s grasp of the subject.
One of the worst examples is his description of the tension caused by the ‘‘lack of
concordance in the sentencing practices of the ICTR and the Rwandan courts.’’ Jones
basically states that the instigators and leaders of the genocide convicted in Arusha
would be sentenced to life imprisonment while those who played smaller, more localized roles ‘‘are liable to receive the death penalty from Rwandan courts.’’ This is an
unacceptably distorted statement.
The post-genocide government hasn’t executed anyone since 1998, when twentytwo convicted génocidaires were hanged in public. The hangings resulted in outrage
from the international public, even though, nations such as the United States and
China still perform executions for less far-reaching and society-damaging crimes
than what were committed in Rwanda. The RPF government claims to disdain international opinion, having been betrayed by virtually the entire world during the genocide. Yet it doesn’t always ignore its critics. By the time I got to Rwanda in 1999,
it was already believed that the executions had caused the government too much
unnecessary damage. At that time, it was widely expected that while criminals
might still be sentenced to death, they were unlikely to be hanged. As each year
passed and no death sentences were carried out, it became increasingly apparent
that none ever would be. Rwanda was abolitionist in practice.
This did not stop the ICTR or foreign governments from refusing to send accused
génocidaires to Rwanda for trial on the grounds that the death penalty was still in
existence. In 2007, Rwanda formally abolished what it had informally stopped practicing years before. (Jones notes this in an entirely different part of the book, referring to ‘‘the recent decision’’ to abolish the death penalty.) Uganda and DRC have
still not eliminated the death penalty. Kenya has abolished it in practice, but not
legally. Fifty-eight countries around the world still retain the death sentence. Yet
the Kagame government can rightly argue that their practice of a decade ago receives greater criticism today than those countries that still retain the death penalty.
And Jones’s book will not assist in alleviating that sentiment.
Jones’s discussion of the ICTR adds little to what others have said long ago,
including my own report nine years ago for the Organization of African Unity’s
international panel on the genocide. The tribunal cost too much, and should have
prosecuted more defendants than it did, but it has produced highly valuable, pathbreaking jurisprudence in the area of genocide on which the International Criminal
Court can build. It should also be noted that for a book dated 2010, Jones’s data on
the number of convictions, acquittals, and appeals are already outdated.
On the gacaca trials, Jones has little to offer. He did most of his field research
just as the system was being fully launched. As a result, he was only able to watch
the preliminary trials. One wonders why he didn’t go back and see how the actual
126
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system worked in practice before he offered the world his observations. In fact, in
many ways the book already seems predominately out of date. Most of his written
sources are several years old. It is clear that the bulk of the writing was done several
years ago, along with the majority of his interviews. In a case like Rwanda’s, where
change is a constant and new developments are forever emerging, far more immediacy is fundamental to a proper understanding of the situation.
Jones’s major contribution to the subject is to remind us of the unfairly high
standards that critics of the Rwandan justice system have demanded since the
moment the genocide ended. In fact, a double standard seems often to apply when
outsiders criticize Rwanda. My own view is that these critics somehow expect the
victims of genocide to live up to a higher morality than other mortals. Human rights
organizations have relentlessly demanded of Rwanda international legal standards
that are not only absent in many Africa countries but also are not fully practiced in
rich countries. Jones describes the utter devastation of the system during the 100
days and the long, difficult task of rebuilding—only one of the huge challenges facing
the neophyte government. To expect ideal Western or international standards under
such circumstances has never made sense, and the contempt of the Rwanda government for many international organizations—duly earned during and immediately
after the genocide, when the Hutu escapees in the Kivus received far more attention
than the country itself—has only been strengthened by these persistent and unbalanced criticisms.
Jones’s conclusions are typically confusing. On page 100 he argues that ‘‘there
remains evidence that the Rwandan government is seeking to create an environment
conducive to the realization of a justice system worthy of its name.’’ Yet on the
following page he concludes that ‘‘victor’s justice continues to be ever present [in
Rwanda], thereby continuing to severely undermine the government’s efforts in operating fair trials. The perceived and real operation of fair trials is crucial in progressing
towards national reconciliation’’ (101).
This last sentence is wholly speculative. Whether in Rwanda or elsewhere, there
is in fact no way of knowing, other than through intuition, whether fair trials impact
reconciliation one way or another, and Jones never discusses this important reality.
As for the victor’s justice, this refers to the high-profile failure of any jurisdiction
dealing with the genocide—ICTR, national courts, or gacaca—to prosecute the war
crimes of the ruling RPF. Jones refers to this deeply controversial issue many times,
as is appropriate, but without really examining the issue critically. It is true that the
RPF was guilty of war crimes before, during, and after the genocide; an entire chapter of my report is dedicated to this matter. And from the first, the new government’s
critics, including major human rights organizations, have repeatedly demanded that
the RPF accused must be tried, just as génocidaires were. But there are issues of
common sense, morality, and triage here.
When has anything other than the victor’s justice prevailed anywhere? Did anyone advocate that the Allied bombers who firebombed German cities in World War II
be tried at Nuremberg alongside Nazi war criminals? Should the pilots who dropped
the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki–or their commanding officers—have
been put in the dock at the Tokyo war crimes trials? Even today, one would be crucified for raising these issues. Is genocide not the crime of crimes? Is it not arguing for
the moral equivalence of the génocidaires and those who defeated them to demand
the prosecution of the RPF well before most of the leading génocidaires have been
tried?
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And then there are the simple, practical issues of logistics and capacity. If the
ICTR cannot work its way through all the cases on its roster, how can we demand
that a whole new category be added? The same can be argued about the courts in
Rwanda. But those demanding the prosecutions of the RPF have shown little sympathy for these practical realities.
Still, it is true that Rwanda pays a potentially severe penalty for the failure to go
after anyone but génocidaires. To use language that is now situationally banned in
Rwanda, what has happened at every judicial level is that, with few exceptions,
only Hutu are being tried. Tutsi hardly ever are. Everyone knows this. That means
that the vast majority of Rwandans, who are of course Hutu, know it. It means that
the members of the Tutsi minority consider themselves the innocent victims of dastardly crimes of which only Hutu are guilty. When the slogan for the annual commemoration rituals includes only the genocide of the Tutsi, it is too easy to conclude
that all and only Tutsi were victims, and all and only Hutu were perpetrators. This
does not appear to be a formula for solidifying reconciliation, though few Rwandans
in the elite seem able to grasp this fairly obvious contradiction.
The complex world of justice is still in its long transitional phase in Rwanda. We
must hope for some penetrating new scholarship that illuminates the process and
offers useful directions for the future. Both the scholarship and the directions are
much needed.
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